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In a text entitled Metaphysics one expects to find a single systematic account of being that 
includes and explains the full diversity of beings. Yet, this is not to be found in Aristotle’s lecture notes on 
ontology that were posthumously given that title. Aristotle argues that the task of ontology is not to grasp 
the totality that every being belongs to, since there can be no all-encompassing category. Instead, its proper 
task is to understand the thinghood of things,1 which he undertakes by developing two different accounts of
their being: one according to their categorical being and another according to their dynamic-energetic 
being. I argue that both types of being are interrelated, and even in certain respects inseparable from each 
other, but neither can be reduced to or derived from the other. Rather, they should be understood as 
equiprimordial aspects of all things, one disclosed by considering a thing as the bearer of essential 
properties and the other by considering the same thing as something capable and at work. Since categorical 
being explains the determinacy of things and dynamic-energetic being explains the unity of their form and 
material, both are required in order to explain the existence of individual things. 
The nature of categorical being and dynamic-energetic being and their roles in Aristotle’s ontology
are matters of scholarly disagreement. Franz Brentano made a major contribution to this discussion with his
first book, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle (1862), in which he argues that they are not merely 
within the mind’s understanding according to Aristotle, but are rather extramental structures and relations 
that constitute beings as such. Brentano represents a widely held view that the categorical sense of being “is
the most important of all” (Brentano, 49). In more recent years, however, this position has been powerfully 
challenged. For instance, Aryeh Kosman in his influential essay, The Activity of Being: an Essay on 
Aristotle’s Ontology (2013), criticizes the habits of thought that have formed around the standard translation
of energeia as “actuality” rather than, as he prefers, “activity.” By overlooking the centrality of activity in 
Aristotle’s ontology, he argues that past interpreters have misunderstood it as a theory of the static essences 
of inert things that underlie their changing incidental properties. In particular, they have missed how 
Aristotle explains the unity of things as something that they actively accomplish, so that their thinghood is 
“the complex union of potency and activity, a union best represented in the model of a power and its 
exercise” (Kosman, 240). Since the categories only exist concretely by belonging to a thing that is 
constituted by its activity of being, it is dynamic-energetic being, beings considered in terms of their 
1  I follow the translator Joe Sachs in rendering ousia as “thinghood” rather than “substance.” As Aryeh 
Kosman (2013) argues, Aristotle uses the term in two ways, sometimes to refer to the things that 
primarily are and other times to that by virtue of which they are such things. As we might speak of 
weights and their weight, Aristotle speaks of substances and their substance (Kosman, 16). Kosman 
continues to use the term “substance” with this in mind, but the distinction between things and 
thinghood better foregrounds what Aristotle is seeking to understand: not a class of entities, “things” or 
“substances,” but the principle that constitutes things as such.
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activities and potencies, that is truly central to Aristotle’s ontology. 
While I agree with much of Kosman’s argument against the standard interpretation of Aristotle, I 
think he goes too far in the opposite direction. The static construal of Aristotle’s ontology is not so much 
wrong as it is incomplete. Building on the work of two other interpreters of Aristotle, Jiyuan Yu and Mark 
Sentesy, I argue below that both categorical being and dynamic-energetic being are ontologically basic in 
Aristotle’s ontology. This is because the dynamic-energetic sense of being presupposes the categorical 
determinacy of things just as the categorical sense of being presupposes the dynamic-energetic unity of 
things. Neither are more fundamental than the other because both depend on each other. Together, they give
us a picture of the world both insofar as it is static and determinate and insofar as it is changing and 
changeable, and of how these two fundamental aspects of being interrelate.
1. The Meaning of Being
1.1 Being is Not a Genus
To understand Aristotle’s analysis of the categorical and dynamic-energetic senses of being, it is 
first necessary to understand what he meant by “being.” Aristotle defines ontology as the investigation of 
“being as being, both what it is and what belongs to it just by virtue of being” (Met. VI.1, 1026a32-33; 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. 1999). This does not mean however that ontology studies what every being 
has in common with every other being, as one might study what every species of animal has in common 
with every other species of animal. According to Aristotle, the structure of classification rules this out. 
Definition requires both a genus and a differentia. For instance, when we define humans as “rational 
animals,” we subsume them under a genus (“animal”) and specify the differentia that makes them a unique 
species (“rational”). By classifying beings in this way, we can discover certain fundamental categories. For 
instance, humans are a kind of animal which is a kind of thing, and red is a kind of color which is a kind of 
quality. Aristotle lists eight such categories in Metaphysics: thing, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion,
place, and time (Met. 5.7, 1017a25-28). He holds that these cannot be subsumed under a still higher 
category of being, but rather are the limits of generality because “it is not possible for either oneness or 
being to be a single genus of things. For it is necessary for each of the things that differentiate each genus to
be and to be one” (Met. III.3, 998b22-25). If the eight categories are species of the genus “being,” then they
must possess some differentia from being; however, a property must satisfy two basic conditions to be a 
differentia: (1) it must not be one of the properties included in the genus that it is paired with (e.g., 
rationality is not included in the genus animal) and (2) it must in some sense exist (e.g., rationality is a 
property of humans). But no property can satisfy both conditions if paired with the genus “being” since 
either a property exists, in which case it cannot be a differentia from being, or it does not exist, in which 
case it cannot be a differentia from being. Therefore, whatever being is, it cannot be a single genus. 
1.2 The Four Senses of Being and the Primacy of Thinghood
Instead of being a single genus, Aristotle holds that there are four different senses of being: 
Being, spoken of simply, is meant in more than one way, of which one is incidental, another 
is as the true (and nonbeing as the false), and besides these there are the modes of predication
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(such as what, of what sort, how much, where, and when something is, and anything else ‘is’ 
means in this way), and still besides all these being-potentially and being-at-work (Met. VI.2,
1026a34-b3).
To consider beings as beings, even “simply” or unqualifiedly, is to consider them in one of four ways: as 
categorical (e.g., “this human is a thing”), as incidental (e.g., “this human is pale”), as dynamic-energetic 
(e.g., “she is building a house”), and as alethic (e.g., “it is (true that it is) raining outside”). Although there 
are different modes of being, that does not mean that they lack unity since each is related to thinghood, 
similarly being a healthy heart and being a healthy meal have unity since each is related to being healthy.   
For it is some individual thing that is potent and at work and that makes judgements about it true or false. 
While not every categorical or incidental property falls under the category “thing,” it is only by belonging 
to a thing that they exist (e.g., while red is a quality and not a thing, it cannot exist except as the redness of 
something). Therefore, each sense of being “is by means of this one, so that what is primary … would be 
thinghood” (Met. VII.1, 1028a31-32). Since all four senses of being refer to things, thinghood is the 
common principle of all of them. Therefore, the question of ontology, “‘what is being?,’ is just this: what is 
thinghood?” (Met. VII.1 1028b24).
1.3 The Incidental Sense of Being
To determine the proper approach to ontology, Aristotle considers which of the four senses of 
being are relevant to it, beginning with incidental being. He describes incidental being as “what is neither 
always nor for the most part” (Met. VI.2, 106b32-33). For instance, pale humans are only incidentally pale 
because being pale does not follow necessarily from being human, nor does it follow characteristically or 
for the most part from being human (Met. VI.2, 1026b37-39). Hence, to consider things according to their 
incidental being is to consider the properties they have that follow neither necessarily nor characteristically 
from what they are in their own right. Aristotle sets this sense of being aside, since “it is clear that there is 
no knowledge of what is incidental, since all knowledge is of what is so always or for the most part” (Met. 
VI.4, 1027a20-22). In other words, the incidental being of things is too contingent and happenstantial to be 
treated by the science of being.
1.4 The Alethic Sense of Being
Next, Aristotle considers alethic being or being as truth. This sense of being is a matter of 
“combining and separating … for truth has the affirmation in the case of a combination and the denial in 
the case of separation, while the false has the contradictory of this division” (Met. VI.4, 1027b19-23). We 
describe single states of affairs in the world with statements that combine subject and predicate terms with 
“is” or separate them with “is not,” for instance when we say, “it is raining outside” or “it is not raining 
outside.” Although we make judgements about things in the world by combining and separating terms that 
are nominally distinct, this does not mean that things themselves are combinations and separations of 
distinct components, for “the intertwining and dividing are in thinking but not in things” (Met. VI.4, 
1027b30). If the judgement “the horse is running” is true, it is not because two originally separate 
components –– a horse and an activity of running –– are being mixed together; rather, it is because the 
thing itself is the coincidence of both as a concrete individual (a running horse). Since alethic being 
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presupposes the existence of individual things as a condition for the truth or falsity of judgements, it cannot
explain them. Therefore, “both being as what is incidental and being as what is true must be set aside” as 
constituting thinghood (Met. VI.4, 1027b4-5). 
2. The Categorical Being of Things
2.1 The Categorical Sense of Being
After setting the incidental and alethic senses of being aside, Aristotle turns to the categorical 
sense of being. Beings considered categorically are bearers of essential properties, which, unlike incidental 
properties, do follow necessarily and generically from what they inherently are. These properties are 
determined by identifying the genera beings fall under and the differentiae that mark them off as distinct 
species, for these make up what they fundamentally are. For instance, a human being who loses their pale 
color by getting a tan would remain human, but a being who lacks by nature rationality or animality would 
not be human. Since “for each thing to be is what is said of it in its own right” (Met. VII.4, 1029b14-15), 
this sense of being is relevant to ontology. Aristotle sets the agenda for his inquiry into the categorical being
of things by reviewing the ordinary interpretations of thinghood: “the thinghood of each thing seems to be 
what it keeps on being in order to be at all, but also seems to be the universal, and the general class, and, 
fourth, what underlies these” (Met. VI.3, 1028b34-36). He proceeds to consider whether thinghood is 
indeed any of these, beginning with the last possibility.
2.2 Thinghood is Form
The thinghood of a thing underlies its incidental properties, it is in some sense an underlying 
thing. Yet it remains unclear whether it is the form of a thing, its material, or the composite of both that 
underlies them. Aristotle clarifies these distinctions with an example, “By the material, I mean, for instance,
bronze, by the form, the shape or the look, and by what is made out of these, the statue” (Met. VII.3, 
1029a3-5). Although material underlies a thing’s form, Aristotle argues that it cannot be thinghood. For “in 
its own right” material “is not [said] to be either something or so much or anything else by which being is 
made definite” but rather “something to which each of these is attributed” (Met. VII.3, 1029a20-22). 
Consider Aristotle’s example of a statue: its “look,” that is, its determinate shape makes it some definite 
recognizable thing. This shape makes something else underlying it, bronze, into that thing. The bronze 
serves as the material of the statue only because it is indeterminate relative to it, lacking in itself the 
properties that make it a statue specifically. Therefore, it is the form and not the material that makes 
something exactly what it is. Since “to be separate and a this seem to belong to an independent thing most 
of all” (Met. VII.3, 1029a27-32), and a thing is some definite this because of its form, “The form and what 
is made out of both seem to be the thinghood more than would the material” (Met. VII.3, 1029a29-30). The 
form-material composite cannot be thinghood either since it is only some determinate thing because of its 
form (Met. VII.3, 1029a30-32). This leaves only one option: the thinghood of things is their form. 
2.3 Thinghood is a Species
Next, Aristotle considers whether thinghood is a genus or a species. For instance, is the form of a 
human being their animality and their rationality, or just the former? To answer this he considers the 
Page 4 of 9
Aristotle's Aspectual Ontology
conditions for proper definitions, which held to be possible “only if the statement articulates some primary 
thing, and things of this kind are all those that are not articulated by attributing one thing to another. 
Therefore there will be no what-it-is-for-it-to-be belonging to anything that is not a species” (Met. VII.4, 
1030a26-31). The definition of an essence does not attribute one thing to something else, but rather 
articulates what one thing is in its own right. The definition of a genus such as “animal,” however, is a mere
abstraction that articulates no concrete existence unless it is attributed to something else, namely, one of its 
species. The definition of a species by contrast does not need to attribute one thing to another in order to 
articulate a primary thing. For instance, when a human being is defined as a rational animal, there is no 
need to then attribute this human being to something else in order to articulate the essence of something 
concrete.
Therefore, the thinghood of things is a species, not a genus.
2.4 Thinghood is Particular
Finally, Aristotle considers whether thinghood is the manner in which particular things exist or a 
universal beyond them. He approaches this question by evaluating the Platonic account of the Forms, 
according to which the true being of things are absolute and timeless essences that transcend all particulars.
For instance, while a particular human being may be good, the form of the good is something else that 
exists over and above them. If this is correct, then the thinghood of things is a universal, not their particular 
manner of being. However, Aristotle disagrees with the Platonic account, “for there is knowledge of 
anything only when we recognize what it is for it to be” (Met. VII.6, 1031b6-7). In other words, the 
question “what is x-ness?” is simply the question “what is it to be x?,” and therefore it makes no sense to 
distinguish between goodness and being good. After all, if they are separable, then goodness would not be 
good (Met. VII.6, 1031b5-11). But that would be absurd, “therefore the good and being-good must be one 
thing” (Met. VII.6, 1031b11-12). This means that the thinghood of things is particular, not universal.
2.5 The Problem of Unity
In sum, the thinghood of things is their form, which is both their species and their particular 
manner of being. Together these explain why things can be legitimately treated as separate and specific 
subjects of predicates that correspond to their essential properties. They are determinate because of their 
form, they admit of proper definitions because they are a concrete species, and they are independent things 
since their essence coincides with their particular being. Yet, none of these can explain the feature of things 
that makes their properties belong to them in the first place: their unity. According to Aristotle, things 
cannot be reduced to a heap of distinct parts but rather are individual wholes. For example:
The semicircle is defined by means of the circle, and also the finger by means of the whole, 
since a finger is a certain sort of part of a human being. And so all those things that are parts 
in the sense of material and into which something divides up as into material are derivative 
from the whole (Met. VII.10, 1035a18-b15).
The material parts of things are what they are only by belonging to the whole as a finger is and 
functions as such only in relation to the whole human being, in separation from which it is a finger in name 
only. So the question arises how the material parts of a thing belong to the whole; for instance, “Why are 
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these things here, say bricks and stones, a house?” (Met. VII.17 1041a28-29). In particular, “What is being 
sought is the responsible thing by means of which the material is something, and this is the form” (Met. 
VII.17, 1041b8-9). Somehow the material parts of a thing are unified with the form as a complete whole 
thing. However, considering things according to their categorical being cannot explain the unity of form 
and material since this mode of consideration opposes the two as different basic features of each thing. To 
explain the unity of things, Aristotle turns to the remaining sense of being: dynamic-energetic being. So 
“What one ought to say thinghood is, and of what sort it is, let us speak about again, as though making 
another start” (Met. VII.17, 1041a6-7; my emphasis).
3. The Dynamic-Energetic Being of Things 
3.1 The Dynamic-Energetic Sense of Being
To consider things according to their dynamic-energetic being is not to consider them as bearers of
essential properties but instead as things that are capable and at work. The Greek terms dunamis and 
energeia used by Aristotle are usually translated as “potentiality” and “actuality” respectively but these 
primarily modal terms do not quite capture their meaning. As Yu (2003) explains with respect to energeia, 
“Ergon means act, work, or function, and hence energeia has a strong connotation of ‘activity’ or 
‘function.’ To say that a thing is actual in the strict sense means that it acts, or it is doing something” (Yu, 
The Structure of Being in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’, 14). To be energetically is not exactly to be actual but to
be actively or to be at work. Dunamis is not exactly modal potentiality either but is rather “a source of 
change in some other thing or in the same thing as other” (Met. IX.1, 1046a11-12), that is, a source of 
change by which one thing changes another thing or changes itself. A dunamis is the activation conditions 
of a change which consist of a certain set of relations of reciprocal effect, for “something is potential both 
by means of its own potency to be acted upon and by something else’s potency to be acted upon by it” 
(Met. IX.1, 1046a21-23). For instance, the activation conditions of a violinist’s potency to play a violin are 
partly satisfied by the active contribution of something else, her violin. While in a sense it is the human 
being who acts on the violin in the activity of violin-playing, the violin-playing itself is the work of both, 
and the source for this activity is a shared potency for violin-playing that precedes and grounds the causal 
agent-patient relationship between them. Sentesy (2020) explains the situation as follows:
Saying that a rubber band is defined by how fingers pull and release it misses exactly what 
makes it a rubber band, namely, the way it responds to stretching by pulling itself back 
together […] [T]he agent-patient relationship is not the fundamental character of sources, but
a derivative feature. (Sentesy, 89)
While change involves one thing affecting or being affected by another, it is their shared potency to whose 
activation each contributes, that makes change possible. Therefore, “The basis of agent-patient 
relationships … is not force, but mutual affection” (Sentesy, 89). In this way, while the perspective of 
categorical being discloses things as separate subjects, the perspective of dynamic-energetic being discloses
them as relational beings. 
3.2 The Irreducibility of Change
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Although change, as the activation of potency, belongs to dynamic-energetic being, this does not 
mean that it does not exhibit the determinacy of categorical being. Rather, change is categorically 
determinate, for “what changes always changes either in thinghood, or in account, or in quality, or in place”
(Ph. III.1, 200b33; Aristotle’s Physics: a Guided Study, trans. 1995). Yet this does not mean that dynamic-
energetic being can be collapsed into categorical being. Sentesy explains: 
Potency and being-at-work are not properties, and this is because they are neither said to be 
in a thing as properties are, nor are they said of it […]. For us, properties are more or less 
what we can say truthfully about something, so for us this includes potency and actuality. But
for Aristotle, potencies and activities are not essential or accidental properties that categorical
beings could ever have, because they are not properties at all: they are a way of 
understanding beings in and through how they operate. (Sentsy, 53-54)
When we understand beings according to their dynamic-energetic being, we do not grasp them in 
terms of their static properties but rather in terms of their activities and potencies. We cannot do so by 
considering what is within or said of them as independent subjects, in part because their potencies and 
activities only exist in relation to others. Since dynamic-energetic being is shot through with categorical 
determinacy, it can be difficult to distinguish the activities and potencies of a thing from its properties. But 
the deficiencies of categorical descriptions of change can be illustrated with the following example from 
Sentesy: “If I say ‘at 1:00 the runner was at Marathon, at 2:15 he was between Marathon and Athens, and at
3:35 he was in Athens,’ I have described the static properties of an object; no motion-like being has been 
articulated” (Sentesy, 74). Such a description only articulates the static properties of subjects at different 
points in the process of change, but it fails to describe the activity of running as such. In order to articulate 
the activities of dynamic beings, they must be described in dynamic-energetic terms. 
3.3 The Two Primary Kinds of Change
According to Aristotle, there are two primary kinds of change: motion and being-at-work. The 
former kind is a change from one thing into something else, or, in other words, an alteration. For instance, 
“losing weight, for the thing that is losing weight, when it is doing so, is in motion in that way, although 
that for the sake of which the motion takes place is not present” (Met. IX.6, 1048b20-23). Other motions 
include learning something, walking somewhere, and building something. Such changes have an end-point,
and cease once they arrive there. Here “end” does not refer to a temporal end but to a condition of 
fulfilment or completion. In this sense, the end of housebuilding is the completed house, not the moment in 
time when housebuilding stops. Since a motion ceases when its end-point is reached, a motion and its 
completion are mutually exclusive conditions.
By contrast, being-at-work is a kind of change that is immediately complete and stays complete as 
long as it persists. For instance, “One has seen and at the same time is seeing the same thing” (Met. IX.6, 
1048b25-26). Here “has seen” does not refer to a completed act of seeing but rather to the exercise of a 
capacity. The exercise of a capacity does not alter the capacity, but rather changes it into being itself 
actively and completely. For instance, although our capacity for perception “follows from being moved and
acted upon” (Soul. II.5, 416b18; On the Soul and on Memory and Recollection, trans. 2001) by perceptible 
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particulars, this affection does not alter what we are qua beings capable of perception just as a thinking 
being is not changed into something else by thinking (Soul. II.5, 417b9-10). An affection that activates a 
capacity is not a kind of alteration but is instead “a passing over into being oneself, namely into being-at-
work-staying-oneself” (Soul. II.5 417b8). Therefore, being-at-work does not change a capacity into 
something else, but rather changes it into being and staying itself completely.
Understanding motion and being-at-work enable us to describe things insofar as they are active 
and changing, in a way that categorical descriptions cannot. Considered according to his categorical being, 
to say that “Socrates is a human being” is to say that his essential form consists of the properties that 
constitute the species “human.” By contrast, considered according to his dynamic-energetic being, to say 
that “Socrates is a human being” is to say, as Witt (1989) elucidates, either that he “is exercising his 
capacity for being human” or that he “has fully achieved that set of capacities which a mature human being 
has” (Witt, Hylomorphism in Aristotle, 147). It is only in the terms of process and end-point or capacity and
exercise that we can articulate Socrates insofar as he is changing.
3.4 The Dynamic-Energetic Unity of Form and Material
So, how does the dynamic-energetic sense of being explain the unity of things? The answer lies in 
considering material and form according to their dynamic-energetic being. In this context, Aristotle 
redefines material as “that which, while not being actively a this, is a this potentially” (Met. VIII.1, 
1042a28). Whereas material is a potency to be something more determinate than it is in and by itself, form 
is the being-at-work of that potency. For instance, Aristotle says that those who define a house as bricks and
lumber “describe the house in potency” (Met. VIII.2, 1043a15), whereas those who define it as “a 
sheltering enclosure for possessions and living bodies … describe its being-at-work” (Met. VIII.2, 
1043a17-18) and those who combine both accounts define it as the “sort of thinghood that is made out of 
these” (Met. VIII.2, 1043a19). The latter describe a house as bricks and lumber whose capacity to be a 
single sheltering enclosure to be living bodies is being exercised, which was activated with the aid of its 
housebuilders and continues to be at work in relation to its occupants and environment. Since form is the 
exercise of the potential of the material, which is simply a capacity to be some this, the form of a thing is 
no longer something other than its material but rather is its ongoing activation.
Yu makes the crucial point that when material and form are not associated with potency and being-
at-work, “form and matter are contingently related” (Yu, 62 ). Considered categorically, the shape and 
structure of a house is only contingently related to whatever parts happens to serve as its material. As far as 
the form is concerned, it makes no difference whatsoever whether these bricks and lumber or those bricks 
and lumber instantiate it. Yet, “when they are associated, form and matter are related necessarily” (Yu, 62). 
Here the form of a house is the activation of just these bricks and lumber, and not those bricks and lumber. 
Since “There is one thing that is material and one that is form, and the former has being as potency and the 
latter as being-at-work, the thing sought after,” namely, the explanation of how the form-material composite
is unified, “would no longer seem to be an impasse” (Met. VIII.6, 1045a21-23; my emphasis). 
4. Conclusion
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Instead of giving us a single theory of everything, Aristotle’s Metaphysics presents us with a non-
systematic account of two interrelated yet irreducibly fundamental aspects of being: the world insofar as it 
consists of objects bearing static essential properties and the world insofar as it is potent and at work, and 
therefore changing and changeable. The former, categorical being, can explain the determinacy of things as 
separate beings constituted by their specific form but it cannot explain the unity of things because of the 
rigid distinction it draws between their form and their material parts. The latter, dynamic-energetic being, 
can explain the unity of things that categorical being presupposes, as the exercise of a capacity to be 
something definite, but it also presupposes categorical being in that change is only possible in and through 
the categorical properties of things. So while both aspects of being are bound up with each other, neither 
can be collapsed into the other. Together they give us a picture of all things both insofar as they are 
fundamentally static and independent and insofar as they are fundamentally changing and relational. At the 
intersection between these two fundamental aspects of their being, things are constituted as such by their 
determinacy and unity. In this way, Aristotle completes the task of ontology – the explanation of thinghood 
– by means of an account of the irreducibly multiple aspects of being. 
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